In West Africa, between 20 and 40% of harvests are lost due to lack of storage. Investing in a warehouse is sometimes worth more than an extra growing season.
Every year, thousands of West African farmers invest in improved seeds, fertilisers, irrigation, and sometimes months of additional labour — only to lose between a fifth and two-fifths of what they have grown, for lack of somewhere to store their harvest. This paradox is well documented, repeatedly observed, and yet structurally overlooked by agricultural policy across the sub-region. It is time to ask the question plainly: for many farming operations, could building a warehouse be a more profitable investment than an additional growing season?
The Figure Nobody Wants to Look at Squarely
The FAO estimates that post-harvest losses in sub-Saharan Africa range between 20 and 40% of production depending on the commodity — maize, tomato, cassava, yam. These figures are not abstractions: they represent evaporated income, undermined food security, and years of work that are partly rendered worthless.
At the Kpalimé market in the Plateaux region of Togo, this phenomenon is visible to the naked eye. At the end of the main rainy season, roadsides fill up with bunches of bananas, sacks of maize, and crates of tomatoes sold at prices that often fail to cover production costs. Not out of generosity, but out of urgency: without storage, immediate sale is the only option.
Maize sold at 80 or 90 FCFA per kilogram in October can reach 180 to 220 FCFA in March, according to seasonal trends regularly observed in sub-regional markets. Those who store, gain. Those who cannot store, suffer.
The Invisible Imbalance in Agricultural Funding
Agricultural support policies in West Africa have long concentrated their efforts on the upstream end of the chain: seeds, fertilisers, equipment, water access. This makes sense — yields per hectare in sub-Saharan Africa remain significantly below world averages for crops such as maize or sorghum (according to FAO data, maize yields in the region hover around 1.5 to 2 t/ha, compared with 5 to 6 t/ha in Europe or North America).
But this upstream effort is partly cancelled out if the downstream side does not exist. Producing 30% more only to lose 35% after harvest means moving backwards. The logic is arithmetic, not ideological.
Yet funding dedicated to storage infrastructure remains structurally marginal in most national agricultural investment plans. The reasons are multiple:
- Political visibility: the inauguration of an irrigation scheme or the distribution of improved seeds is more visible than a metal warehouse.
- The agricultural credit model: microfinance institutions and agricultural banks are more willing to finance short cycles (one season's inputs) than multi-year infrastructure perceived as less liquid.
- The absence of land tenure security: in many areas, uncertainty over land rights discourages long-term investment — a warehouse built on a plot without a land title is a genuine patrimonial risk.
Kpalimé, Lomé, and the Reality of Short Supply Chains
Consider the concrete case of the Kpalimé area and its connections to Lomé, approximately 120 kilometres to the south. This corridor is one of Togo's most dynamic agricultural axes: cacao and coffee historically, but also maize, beans, and market-garden vegetables destined to supply the capital.
Transporters and intermediary traders play an essential role in this circuit — and they capture a significant share of the value, precisely because they have storage capacity and the ability to time their sales, which producers do not. This is not a conspiracy: it is the remuneration of a genuine logistical function. But it also means that the producer's margin shrinks as their dependence on immediate sale increases.
A maize farmer in Kpalimé with access to a secure 20-tonne warehouse can choose when to sell. They can wait until February or March, when supply contracts and prices recover. They can sell directly to consumer groups in Lomé or to school canteens, whose tenders are spread throughout the year. In doing so, they recover a share of the value currently captured by intermediaries.
The logic of short supply chains does not rest on local production alone: it depends on the ability to deliver at the right moment, which requires storage.
Solar Cold Chains: An Under-Exploited Lever
For perishable commodities — tomatoes, onions, peppers, leafy vegetables — simply building a warehouse is not enough. A cold chain is needed. And that is where the cost can appear prohibitive.
Yet the evolution of solar refrigeration equipment is changing the picture. Cold room solutions powered by photovoltaic panels now exist at prices that are becoming accessible to medium-sized cooperatives — between 5 and 15 million FCFA depending on capacity and supplier, according to trends observed in the West African market in recent years.
This cost remains out of reach for an individual producer. But it becomes relevant at the scale of a cooperative with 30 to 50 members, especially when financing is pooled and supported. The return on investment, in a commodity like tomatoes where losses can exceed 35% depending on climatic and logistical conditions, can be rapid.
It is precisely this type of integrated investment — dry storage for cereals, solar cold chains for perishables, training in stock management — that SFH is incorporating into its thinking for its Kpalimé site. Not as a turnkey solution, but as a working hypothesis to be validated with local producers and their organisations.
What Needs to Change in Agricultural Policy
The critique here is not directed at individual actors, but at a financing and public policy architecture that continues to undervalue the post-harvest value chain. In practical terms, several levers deserve to be reconsidered:
- Redirect a share of input subsidies towards dedicated credit lines for storage infrastructure, with appropriate maturities (a minimum of 3 to 5 years).
- Secure agricultural land tenure through recognised titles or leases, a prerequisite for any long-term investment.
- Include storage cooperatives in public guarantee schemes, on the same footing as irrigation or mechanisation projects.
- Incorporate post-harvest quality standards into public procurement tenders (school canteens, hospitals) to incentivise better conservation before delivery.
- Train producers in stock management: drying techniques, humidity control, aflatoxin prevention — technical knowledge that is too rarely included in extension programmes.
These directions do not stem from any particular doctrine. They stem from economic common sense, documented by decades of agronomic research and evaluation reports that decision-makers are often very well acquainted with.
Producing Better Starts with Stopping the Waste of What Has Already Been Produced
African agriculture does not need a new green revolution to feed the continent — it first needs to stop wasting what it already produces. Yield per hectare is an important variable, but it is not the only one. The ability to add value to every kilogram produced, to sell it at the right time, at the right price, in the right condition: that is what storage makes possible.
In the Kpalimé region as elsewhere in West Africa, natural conditions are often favourable to productive agriculture. What is rarely lacking is the will of the producers. What is often lacking is the infrastructure that transforms their labour into stable income. A quality warehouse, well designed, well managed, shared among several farms, may be the most sober and most immediately profitable agricultural investment there is — provided that funders, both public and private, finally agree to see it as such.